In Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, independent cooperative learners must overcome a number of pathologies in order to learn optimal joint policies. These pathologies include action-shadowing, stochasticity, the moving target and alterexploration problems (Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2012; Wei and Luke 2016). Numerous methods have been proposed to address these pathologies, but evaluations are predominately conducted in repeated strategic-form games and stochastic games consisting of only a small number of state transitions. This raises the question of the scalability of the methods to complex, temporally extended, partially observable domains with stochastic transitions and rewards. In this paper we study such complex settings, which require reasoning over long time horizons and confront agents with the curse of dimensionality. To deal with the dimensionality, we adopt a Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning (MA-DRL) approach. We find that when the agents have to make critical decisions in seclusion, existing methods succumb to a combination of relative overgeneralisation (a type of action shadowing), the alter-exploration problem, and the stochasticity. To address these pathologies we introduce expanding negative update intervals that enable independent learners to establish the near-optimal average utility values for higher-level strategies while largely discarding transitions from episodes that result in mis-coordination. We evaluate Negative Update Intervals Double-DQN (NUI-DDQN) within a temporally extended Climb Game, a normal form game which has frequently been used to study relative overgeneralisation and other pathologies. We show that NUI-DDQN can converge towards optimal joint-policies in deterministic and stochastic reward settings, overcoming relativeovergeneralisation and the alter-exploration problem while mitigating the moving target (non-stationarity) problem.
Introduction
The Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MA-RL) literature provides a rich taxonomy of learning pathologies that cooperative Independent Learners (ILs) must overcome to converge upon an optimal joint-policy. While searching for this optimal joint-policy the actions of ILs influence each others' search space (Panait, Sullivan, and Luke 2006) . This can lead to action shadowing, where miscoordination due to sub-optimal joint-policies results in utility values of optimal actions being underestimated (Fulda and Ventura 2007) . In this paper we address a sub-case of action shadowing called relative overgeneralisation (RO), which can occur when pairing an IL's available actions with arbitrary actions by the other agents results in a sub-optimal action having the highest utility estimate (Wei and Luke 2016) . This pathology has implications for multi-agent systems where ILs can be drawn towards wider peaks in the reward search space due to a greater likelihood of finding collaborators (Panait, Sullivan, and Luke 2006) . Other pathologies that we address include stochasticity, the alter-exploration problem (AEP) and the moving target (non-stationarity) problem.
Numerous methods have been proposed in MA-RL literature to help ILs cope with the above pathologies. Traditionally these methods are studied within the context of strategic form games (matrix games) and fully observable stochastic games (consisting of a small number of probabilistic state transitions). However, finding robust solutions that perform consistently within traditional settings is challenging (Wei and Luke 2016) . Frequently solutions to one pathology leave agents vulnerable towards others. For solutions that perform consistently within traditional settings questions remain regarding scalability, i.e., can these approaches overcome the same pathologies in complex domains that suffer from the curse of dimensionality and require reasoning over long time horizons? To answer this question we evaluate the ability of decentralized Deep MA-RL (MA-DRL) agents to overcome the pathologies outlined above within a temporally extended, partially observable version of the Climb Game (Claus and Boutilier 1998) , which we call the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG). To date the majority of MA-DRL research has focused on stochasticity and mitigating an amplified non-stationarity problem resulting from obsolete state transitions being stored inside Experience Replay Memories (ERM) (Foerster et al. 2017; Palmer et al. 2018; Zheng et al. 2018; Omidshafiei et al. 2017) . The AFG meanwhile allows us to study the impact of RO in addition to stochasticity, alter-exploration and the moving target problems in a system that requires a MA-DRL approach.
We evaluate Leniency and Hysteretic Q-Learning agents within the AFG, two MA-RL algorithms that perform well in traditional settings and have recently been extended to MA-DRL (Palmer et al. 2018; Omidshafiei et al. 2017) . Hysteretic Q-Learning is a form of optimistic learning (Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2007) , while lenient agents are initially forgiving towards teammates, often ig-noring state transitions that would lower a utility value (Panait, Sullivan, and Luke 2006) . However, the more often an observation-action pair is encountered, the less likely lenient learners are to be forgiving. This makes lenient learners less vulnerable towards misleading stochastic rewards compared to optimistic approaches (Wei and Luke 2016) . However, we find that both algorithms succumb to a combination of RO, the alter-exploration problem, and stochasticity when having to make critical decisions in seclusion. Lenient learners face the following dilemma in the AFG: remain lenient and be led astray by misleading stochastic rewards, or attempt to estimate the average coordinated utility for each higher level strategy through being less lenient. However, this leaves lenient learners vulnerable towards the alter-exploration problem and oscillating utility values belonging to each of the higher level strategies as a result of stochastic transitions. This inspired a new approach where agents maintain expanding negative update intervals for higher level strategies, allowing initially forgiving agents to establish the average reward for each strategy while discarding transitions from episodes where the reward received is below the lower interval bounds. We call this approach NUI-DDQN (Negative Update Intervals Double-DQN).
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows. 1) We introduce NUI-DDQN, a MA-DRL algorithm which discards episodes yielding rewards outside the range of expanding intervals maintained for higher level strategies. NUI-DDQN reduces the impact of miscoordination on utility estimates, allowing agents to overcome RO and the AEP.
2) We empirically evaluate NUI-DDQN, including earlier Hysteretic and Lenient approaches in temporally-extended variations of the Climb Game which we call the Apprentice Firemen Game. We identify a setting that poses a challenge for existing approaches, where agents must independently make an irrevocable decision in seclusion regarding the choice of higher level strategy. This decision has a delayed impact on the outcome of the game which in turn affects utility estimates. Therefore agents face a similar dilemma as in the repeated game versions of the climb game. However, unlike in the repeated game the decision is made using deceiving noisy utility estimates as a result of backed-up rewards from a large number of stochastic follow-on transitions.
3) We find Hysteretic agents are able to consistently overcome RO within deterministic settings, but predominately converge towards sub-optimal joint policies when receiving misleading stochastic rewards. Lenient learners meanwhile overcome RO and stochastic rewards, but only when able to learn best responses to each others strategy. NUI-DDQN is the only approach that consistently converges towards the optimal joint-policy in the challenging secluded setting outlined above for deterministic and stochastic rewards.
Pathologies in MA-RL
In this section we will elaborate on the pathologies outlined above. As mentioned addressing one pathology often comes at the cost of leaving agents vulnerable towards others. We therefore discuss these relations while considering the implications of tackling the pathologies in complex environments.
Relative Overgeneralisation (RO). As mentioned RO is a sub-case of Action Shadowing, occurring in games where a sub-optimal Nash Equilibrium yields a higher payoff on average when each selected strategy is paired with an arbitrary strategy chosen by the other player (Wei and Luke 2016) . The Climb Game (Claus and Boutilier 1998) outlined in Figure 1 is frequently used to study the susceptibility of ILs towards RO, where evidently the optimal joint strategy for both players is (A, A). However, assuming that two independent learning agents initially choose each of the strategies available with equal probability, using an average based algorithm (Wei and Luke 2016), then Agent 1 will estimate that C should be preferred over A, since (A, j) < (C, j) for each of Agent 2's strategies j. Agent 2 will come to the same conclusion, resulting in the agents gravitating towards the sub-optimal joint strategy (C, C). Interestingly, if an alternative strategy is still being played with a small probability after RO draws the average based learners towards (C, C), then Agent 1 should move from strategy C to B. Subsequently Agent 2 should take the final climb step from C to B. At this point the agents will climb no further, having reached a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium.
The Climb Game is often studied as a repeated game. We are interested in solving an equivalent game extended over the temporal dimension within domains suffering the curse of dimensionality, where combining the sequences of atomic actions performed by each agent results in outcomes similar to the joint-strategies from figure 1. We call these sequences of actions higher level strategies. In repeated games agents make choices simultaneously. This property is maintained in a sequential setting by enforcing that agents independently make irrevocable decisions in parallel in a secluded setting where the actions taken by other agents cannot be observed. However, unlike in repeated games, agents facing the curse of dimensionality must maintain utility values using a function approximator with rewards backed-up from long sequences of potentially stochastic follow-on states. Stochasticity. In the Climb Game outlined above RO can be overcome via a maximum-based approach, where Agent 1 considers each strategy i based on the observed max j (i, j) and vice-versa (Wei and Luke 2016) . However, this approach leaves agents vulnerable towards stochastic rewards. For example, in the Partially Stochastic Climb Game (figure 2) the joint strategy (B, B) yields stochastic rewards of 14 and 0 with 50% probability. Evidently maximum based learners will be drawn towards (B, B), despite each agent only receiving a reward of 7 on average.
In temporally extended games additional stochasticity can emerge as a result of environmental factors such as noisy observations (Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2012) . Stochastic games meanwhile consist of probabilistic state transitions and optionally stochastic rewards. ILs facing the curse of dimensionality must therefore overcome RO despite learning noisy approximated utility estimates backedup from stochastic follow-on state-transitions and rewards, while distinguishing environmental stochasticity from miscoordination (Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2012) .
The alter-exploration problem. The explorationexploitation trade-off required by reinforcement learners adds to the challenge of learning noise-free utility estimates. Matignon et al. (2012) define global exploration, the probability of at least one of n agents exploring, as 1 − (1 − ) n , where each agent explores according to a probability . The alter-exploration problem represents a significant challenge to agents in environments with shadowed equilibria, such as the Climb Game (Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2012) . Furthermore, we consider that in the temporally extended Climb Game agents face 2 types of alter-exploration. The first type is due to agents exploring at an atomic level, where small sequences of actions may be sub-optimal, e.g., collisions with obstacles, sub-optimal paths, etc. The second type of alter-exploration is related to the choice of higher level strategies. We therefore argue that in-order for MA-DRL algorithms to overcome the alter-exploration problem considerations are required at both levels. 
MA-DRL: Independent Learning Approaches
The MA-DRL algorithms evaluated are extensions of the Double-DQN (DDQN) introduced by Van Hasselt et al. (2016) . Each agent i is implemented with a Convolutional Network trained to approximate Q-Values for observationaction pairs: Leibo et al. 2017 (Leibo et al. 2017) .
Hysteretic Q-Learning. Hysteretic Q-Learning is an optimistic MA-RL algorithm originally introduced to address maximum based learner's vulnerability towards stochasticty by using two learning rates α and β, where β < α (Wei and Luke 2016) . Learning rate β reduces the impact of negative Q-Value updates while learning rate α is used for positive updates (Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2007) . However, Hysteretic Q-Learners have a tendency to gravitate towards sub-optimal policies when receiving misleading stochastic rewards (Wei and Luke 2016; Palmer et al. 2018) .
Leniency. Lenient learners have proven robust towards stochastic rewards by initially forgiving (ignoring) suboptimal actions by teammates, while over time applying an average based approach for frequently visited (o i , a i ) pairs (Panait, Sullivan, and Luke 2006; Panait, Tuyls, and Luke 2008; Zheng et al. 2018; Wei and Luke 2016; Palmer et al. 2018 ). The frequency with which negative updates are performed is determined by equation 1. A random variable x ∼ U (0, 1) ensures that a negative update is executed with a probability 1 − l(o i , a i ). Constant K is a leniency moderation factor which determines how the temperature value affects the drop-off in lenience (Wei and Luke 2016) . The tem-
Meanwhile, Lenient-DDQNs store the leniency value computed at time t inside the ERM, subsequently determining the frequency with which the corresponding transition can induce negative updates (Palmer et al. 2018) .
The Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG) Sequential Social Dillemas (SSDs) contain the mixed incentive structure of strategic-form games while requiring agents to learn atomic sequences of actions that implement the higher level strategies (Leibo et al. 2017 ). We formulate a SSD based on the Climb Game that we call the Apprentice Fireman Game (AFG), where two (or more) agents located within a gridworld are tasked with locating and extinguishing fires. First however the agents must locate an equipment storage area and choose one of the items listed below: The task is cooperative, therefore two agents are required to extinguish a fire. As outlined in the table above both agents detonating an explosive device (fighting fire with fire) is the most effective combination, equivalent to the jointstrategy (A, A) in the Climb Game. While the fire extinguisher is more effective than the fire blanket, agents choosing one run the risk of being hit by debris, whereas the fire blanket offers protection. Therefore the fire extinguisher and fire blanket are equivalent to B and C respectively.
As mentioned above players within repeated strategicform games make simultaneous strategy choices, thereby
(.9/.7, .9/.7) (.2/ − 1, .2/ − 1) (.6/ − .6, .6/ − .6) (.2/ − 1, .2/ − 1) (1.0/0, 1.0/0)* (.9/.1, .9/.1) (.6/ − .6, .6/ − .6) (.4/ − .4, .4/ − .4) (.8/0, .8/0) Figure 3 : Reward structures for deterministic (DET), partially stochastic (PS) and fully stochastic (FS) apprentice firemen games, to be interpreted as rewards for (agent1, agent2). For (B,B)* within PS and FS 1.0 is yielded on 60% of occasions.
preventing agents from choosing best responses. We can enforce the same property by adding constraints to the AFG that force agents to independently make irrevocable decisions regarding the choice of the higher level strategy in a secluded setting, where the actions taken by other agents cannot be observed. However, even without these constraints, ILs are not explicitly told which actions the other agents have performed (Wei and Luke 2016) . We hypothesize that independent learners should be capable of implicitly learning to identify the higher level strategies selected by observable agents and the corresponding best responses. To test this hypothesis we conduct experiments within two different AFG layouts outlined below. In both layouts the agents receive local observations 6 pixels in each direction. Upon entering a pickup cell the agents (white) change their color to that of the equipment selected. Equipment selection decisions are irrevocable for the duration of the episode. An episode ends once each fire in the environment has 2 agents located in neighbouring cells or when a upper limit of 10'000 steps is reached (resulting in a rewards of -1.0). Regarding actions agents can choose to move up, down, left, right or to do nothing. DQNs tend to perform well when receiving rewards within [−1, 1], which led us to choose the reward structures listed in figure 3 . Layout 1 (sub- figure 4a ): Two agents are located within a 13 × 13 pixel gridworld with one fire occurring per episode. Agents share an equipment storage area, and can therefore observe each other during the selection process. Given the simplicity of this layout we use color codes that are harder to distinguish to increase the difficulty of the learning task. Layout 2 (sub- figure 4b) : Starting episodes at separate fire stations the agents are unable to observe each other while selecting equipment. Borrowing game theoretic terminology the agents make irrevocable decisions regarding the choice of higher level strategy with imperfect monitoring, therefore without observing the actions of the other agents (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990) . Simulations take place within a padded 53 × 53 gridworld, where the main chamber consists of a grid street plan. Each episode n/2 randomly selected buildings are set on fire, where n is the number of agents. Randomly moving civilians add further stochasticity to the environment by obstructing roads towards the fire.
Configuration
Networks consist of 2 convolutional layers with 32 and 64 kernels respectively, a fully connected layer (1024 neurons) and an output node for each action. We use learning rate α = 0.0001 and discount rate γ = 0.95. For HDDQNs β represents the percentage of α. Each ERM stores 250'000 transitions. In layout 1 LDDQNs use a leniency moderation factor K = 1.0 and Python's xxhash to generate hash keys to map (o i , a i ) pairs to temperatures. Numerous hyperparameter combinations were tried for layout 2, while generating HashKeys using an AutoEncoder (Palmer et al. 2018 ). 
Learning Best Responses (Layout 1)
We evaluate LDDQN and HDDQN (β 0.4 to 0.9) in layout 1, conducting 20 runs of 5000 episodes for each setting. LD-DQN runs consist of 10'000 episodes to allow for sufficient cooling of temperature values. Both LDDQN and HDDQN (β = 0.4) can overcome RO when receiving deterministic rewards. However, despite agents observing each other while choosing higher level strategies only LDDQN agents consistently gravitate towards the optimal joint policy when receiving partially stochastic rewards, initially gravitating towards the misleading sub-optimal (B, B) before converging upon the optimal (A, A). However, we notice that increasing the number of access points to the fire, and thereby the number of T t (o i , a i ) values that need to be decayed, delays convergence upon (A, A) (figure 5).
Figure 5: LDDQN running % of optimal strategy selection in layout 1, conditioned on fire access points. For 1 access point agents were allowed to overlap next to the fire.
Irrevocable decisions with imperfect monitoring and delayed rewards
We were unable to find a configuration where lenient learners consistently converge upon the optimal joint-policy in layout 2. When selecting a higher level strategy in seclusion lenient learners face a dilemma regarding the decay of their temperature values. Overcoming stochastic rewards backed up from follow-on states requires temperature cooling (Wei and Luke 2016) . However, decaying the temperatures results in vulnerability towards the following pathologies: Stochastic Transitions: Stochasticitiy introduced by civilians and random re-positioning of the fires causes utility values leading to equipment pickup actions to oscillate (more details below). These oscillations can result in extended periods of miscoordination. With insufficient leniency the learners suffer the same fate as average reward learners. Alter Exploration Problem: The transitions from lenient agent to average reward learner and from explorer to exploiter requires further consideration. If the transition to average reward learner occurs before agents have started exploiting, then the agents will succumb to the alter exploration problem. Alternatively lenient exploiting agents will suffer the same fate as maximum reward learners. Literature has addressed the exploration-exploitation problem for lenient learners (Wei and Luke 2016; Palmer et al. 2018) , however, we find that further considerations are required.
Negative Update Intervals Double-DQN
We believe lenient learners are vulnerable towards the above pathologies due to indiscriminately performing negative updates with a probability 1 − l(o i , a i ). We consider an alternative approach where updates are conditioned on intervals by maintaining lower bound values l s for each higher level strategy s. We call this approach Negative Update Intervals Double-DQN (NUI-DDQN). The aim is to find ranges of terminal rewards that allow the agents to maintain the average optimal utility for each higher level strategy. By maintaining update intervals NUI-DDQN is more likely to recover from oscillating utility values while mitigating the alter exploration problem. Crucially by reducing the impact of miscoordination NUI-DDQN agents can overcome RO while receiving stochastic rewards. Initially l s is set to the maximum reward m s received for strategy s. We establish m s during an initial random exploration run used to fill the ERMs. During training we gradually decay l s . However, to prevent l s from decaying during phases where other strategies are predominantly being explored (alter-exploration problem) we only decay l s when r t ≥ m s − ε, where ε represent a small value. We maintain vectors R s which store the most recent n rewards for each strategy, and use each vector's mean and standard deviation to establish the minimum values for our lower boundaries. Upon reaching a terminal state and receiving a reward r t , the transitions from an episode are stored if:
The higher level strategies required by NUI-DDQN are sequences of atomic actions, frequently referred to as op- Observe o 0 and choose a 0 ∼ π θ (o 0 ) 10:
for t = 1 to T do 11:
Observe o t , r t 12: end if 30: end for tions (Sutton and Barto 1998). However, unlike in options learning, where a meta-controller is tasked with choosing the goal that a controller is trained to master (Bacon, Harb, and Precup 2017) , our approach requires an observer capable of identifying which strategy was performed. Similar to Ghavamzadeh et al. (2006) we manually specify cooperation strategies and incorporate them as domain knowledge.
To allow agents to maintain Q-Values for less frequently observed strategies without preventing outdated transitions from being discarded we implement a separate ERM for each strategy s. Instead of storing n transitions each ERM s stores n episodes. We observe that traditional ERMs may store a significant number of obsolete transitions once agents become efficient at solving a task and require less steps. Episodic ERMs meanwhile are more likely to reflect the current search space. During sampling we concatenate the individual replay memories. For more details regarding the implementation of NUI-DDQN see algorithm 1.
Learning Dynamics (Layout 2)
We evaluate NUI-DDQN using phase plots within simplexes allowing us to gain valuable insights regarding shifts in the strategy distributions throughout the training runs conducted (Figures 6 -8) . We contrast the learning dynamics with those of HDDQNs, conducting 30 runs of 10,000 episodes for each configuration. Within the simplexes each line illustrates the running average strategy distribution (rolling window of 1000 episodes). Each corner represents 100% usage of the labelled strategy. Therefore the black squares at the centre of each plot represent the averaged initial strategy distributions, the lines represents the averaged distributions throughout the 30 runs, and the red dots represents the final distribution. Regarding the hyperparamter configuration for NUI-DDQN, each ERM s stores 100 episodes, while the decay rate for lower bounds l s is 0.995. NUI-DDQN (2 Agents). Figure 6 illustrates that NUI-DDQN can overcome RO in deterministic and stochastic reward settings. Despite the stochasticity introduced by civilians being apparent in sub-figures 6d & 6f, we observe that A remains the most frequently used strategy. Meanwhile when receiving partially stochastic rewards, agents initially gravitate towards strategy B, before correcting themselves upon establishing that B is sub-optimal (sub-figures 6c & 6d). For fully-stochastic rewards (C, C) yields an additional misleading reward. This is reflected in sub-figures 6e & 6f, where upon establishing that (B, B) is sub-optimal we see an increase in the selection of both A and C. In sub-figure 6e the agents subsequently establish that C is also sub-optimal. Figure 7 provides interesting insights regarding the impact of different levels of optimism on the learning dynamics. In sub-figures 7a to 7c we can see that a large amount of optimism (β = 0.5) allows agents to overcome RO within the deterministic AFG. The learning dynamics within the partially stochastic reward setting (sub-figures 7d to 7f) reveal that β = 0.5 agents consider A as an option prior to gravitating towards (B, B). Agent 2 for β = 0.7 initially gravitates towards C. The pull is even stronger for β = 0.9, but we subsequently observe the climb step to B. When receiving fully stochastic rewards (subfigures 7g to 7i) lower values for β increase the usage of strategy B over C, while optimal strategy A is discarded. NUI-DDQN (4-Agents). We conducted further trials within a 4 agent fully-stochastic setting, where the agent with the lower id receives the reward for agent 1 (Figure 8 ). We observe that only agent 1 initially gravitates towards B, whereas the remaining agents initially gravitate towards C before converging upon the optimal strategy A. Interestingly the civilians appear to have less impact on the final distributions compared to the 2 agent fully stochastic runs.
Utility Values Analysis
Q-values belonging to state-action pairs that result in an unequipped agent picking up an item provide interesting insights regarding the influence of each algorithm studied and the impact of civilians. Upon introducing civilians we observe that pickup Q-Values oscillate more compared to the runs without civilians (figure 9). As a result the B Q-Values frequently rise above the A Q-Values for NUI-DDQN when receiving partially stochastic rewards. We also observe that NUI-DDQN initially overestimates the utility for strategy B, before gradually expanding the intervals and establish the average reward for each strategy. Figure 10 meanwhile illustrates that for HDDQN (β = 0.7) the utility values for B are overestimated when receiving partially stochastic rewards. the additional information that centralized learning provides. For future work it would be interesting to survey each of these approaches to compare how independent learning and centralized training for decentralized execution approaches cope when confronted with RO.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our empirical evaluation highlights the vulnerability of MA-DRL agents towards pathologies discussed in MA-RL literature. Finding that NUI-DDQN can overcome a number of these pathologies in the AFG raises questions regarding general applicability. The algorithm would benefit from further evaluations using a large range of reward distributions and negative rewards as a result of avoidable environmental factors in addition to miscoordination. Furthermore, we plan empirical evaluations with ad-hoc teammates, scenarios with more than 3 higher level strategies, and the evaluation of further learning algorithms within the AFG. To summarize our contributions: 1) We introduce NUI-DDQN, a MA-DRL algorithm that maintains expanding negative update interval to identify and discard episodes that end in miscoordination. The update intervals allow NUI-DDQN to overcome relative overgeneralisation and the alter-exploration problem.
2) We empirically evaluate NUI-DDQN, HDDQN (Omidshafiei et al. 2017) and LDDQN (Palmer et al. 2018 ) in temporally-extended variations of the Climb Game which we call the Apprentice Firemen Game. We enforce imperfect monitoring (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990) by imposing constraints that require agents to independently make an irrevocable decision in seclusion regarding the choice of higher level strategy.
3) We find that while HDDQN agents are able to consistently overcome RO in deterministic settings, they are unable to converge towards optimal joint-policies once stochastic rewards are introduced. LDDQN meanwhile can overcome both RO and stochastic rewards, but only when learning best responses to the other agent's strategy. Only NUI-DDQN consistently converges towards the optimal joint-policy in the challenging secluded setting when receiving either deterministic or stochastic rewards. Figure 12 illustrates each of the layouts used for the access point comparison trials conducted for LDDQN agents. For the 1 Access Point (sub-figure 12a) trials both agents were allowed to occupy the final cell next to the fire. The runs were conducted using the partially stochastic reward structure (Figure 3) . The learning dynamics illustrated in figure 13 show that increasing the number of observation action pairs for which temperature values need to be decayed results in the agents no longer being able to converge upon a 100% usage of strategy A, even after 10000 episodes. Figure 14 meanwhile illustrates how increasing the number of access points delays the decline in the percentage of joint-strategy (B, B). 
